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ever made at presenting a connected history of these literatures. Both are scholars well known to the readers of this *Journal*, especially Leipoldt, whose contributions to the *Texte und Untersuchungen* of Gebhardt and von Harnack have been noticed in this *Journal* from time to time. The history of Coptic literature occupies pp. 131-83; that of Ethiopic literature, pp. 185-270. Both literatures, Coptic as well as Ethiopic, are rather limited in scope and character. It was thus a much easier task than that of Brockelmann and Finck. These two histories are by far the best thus far produced and will prove of great value, interest, and benefit to theologians as well as orientalists. It is to be regretted that, here also, the limited space prevented the authors from entering more deeply into their chosen subjects, especially inasmuch as both are well-known authorities in these comparatively new fields of study and research. The history of Coptic literature, especially, deserved more space owing to its importance for the origins of Christian literature. May we hope that ere long we shall be favored with adequate histories of these literatures by Professor Littmann and Dr. Leipoldt.

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TWO IMPORTANT BOOKS ON ETHICS

To have in two successive years philosophical problems discussed in the lectures of the Lowell Institute by such radically differing men as Professor James and Professor Royce is an interesting phenomenon of American public education. Professor James has won many friends by his rare ability to express his ideas in concrete and sometimes whimsical fashion. His books are delightful as literature, apart from their other merits. In this happy capacity of clearness of exposition, Professor Royce is also a master. His volume on *The Philosophy of Loyalty*,¹ like his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, is intelligible even to the untrained student, while at the same time preserving its philosophical interest for experts.

Throughout the book one feels in the background Professor Royce's evident distrust of the extreme empiricism represented in so many tendencies of modern thought, and sanctified by pragmatism. His purpose, as stated in the first lecture, is to discover some means by which we may not become demoralized during the reconstruction of our ideals. "I do not believe that unsettlement is finality. . . . I believe in the eternal. I am

¹ *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. By Josiah Royce. New York: Macmillan, 1908. 409 pages. \$1.50 net.

in quest of the eternal. . . . I want, as well as I can, not merely to help you to revise some of your moral standards, but to help you to give to this revision some definite form and tendency, some image and hint of finality" (pp. 10, 11). And after the positive exposition of his own conception of the moral problem, he gives a chapter to explicit criticism of pragmatism.

Professor Royce is well aware of the social process by which our moral ideals arise. He elaborates, in a somewhat typically Hegelian manner, the conflict which arises between the desires of the individual and the demands of society and tradition. The individual's growth is thus a never-ending interplay between the subjective and the objective factors of his social life. Out of this conflict arises the ultimate synthesis, which Professor Royce sums up in the term "loyalty." By loyalty he means "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." In this devotion the opposition between self-interest and the demands of the outer world is resolved in a higher unity. Loyalty is thus the supreme principle of morality. It is the all-inclusive term in which can be summed up all the special forms of morality. By anchoring to this fundamental ideal, we may revise our practical behavior without danger of falling into confusion.

The application of this principle to the development of personal character is wholesome and uplifting. One realizes afresh what a genuine moral power resides in philosophical idealism. The attainment of individual capacity and achievement is seen to be dependent upon the individual's surrender to something bigger than self. The complete failure of the ideals of hedonism or of individualistic self-realization to justify moral distinctions is admirably shown. The author's comment on certain extremists in this respect is worth quoting:

In view of such considerations, when I listen to our modern ethical individualists—to our poets, dramatists, essayists, who glorify personal initiative—to our Walt Whitman, to Ibsen, and, above all, to Nietzsche—I confess that these men move me for a time, but that ere long, I listen with impatience. Of course, I then say, be indeed autonomous. Be an individual. But for heaven's sake, set about the task. Do not forever whet the sword of your resolve. Begin the battle of real individuality. Why these endless preliminary gesticulations? "Leave off thy grimaces," and begin. There is only one way to be an ethical individual. That is to choose your cause, and then to serve it, as the Samurai his feudal chief, as the ideal knight of romantic story his lady—in the spirit of all the loyal (p. 98).

So far, there would be so serious quarrel between Professor Royce and the empiricist. Both realize that morality consists in loyalty to the larger

social good, and both would seek to cherish this spirit of loyalty as the *sine qua non* of any practical social morality. But when we ask the further question as to how it is to be cultivated, the paths divide. The empiricist would analyze the historical genesis of our actual moral social situation. He would attempt so to classify the empirical data that the next step might appear evident, and he would expect that in the process of tracing this exact account of the rise of moral goodness among men, a lively sympathy would be developed which would carry one with enthusiasm over into the practical expression of loyalty in working out future problems. Professor Royce, on the contrary, "believes in the eternal." He would secure our moral progress by inculcating devotion to an ideal principle which may be applied a priori to all concrete moral problems. And this ideal is thus formulated: "Be loyal to loyalty. It is this larger principle which enables one to differentiate between such evil-bringing forms of loyalty as are seen in warfare and those desirable forms which make for universal welfare. Mere partisanship can thus be distinguished from real devotion to human welfare.

But so stated, the principle is merely a formal precept. If we are to obey it with any enthusiasm, we need some assurance that loyalty is indeed of value in the universe. Following the clue furnished by our idealizing of the causes which we serve, and by the persistence of loyalty to a lost cause, Professor Royce rejects any utilitarian sanction for morality. We need some assurance, other than mere worldly success, that our loyalty is not thrown away. And this assurance can come only from philosophical religious faith. Our ideals point to a superempirical reality, an absolute, in whose experience are gathered up all the fragmentary valuations which we are able to make. By relating our conceptions and ideals to this absolute experience, they attain eternal validity. Thus loyalty becomes something more than a formal moral maxim. It is a form of religious faith, akin to the belief in truth as an ultimate. From this point of view, Professor Royce enters upon a criticism of Professor James's lectures of the previous year. In seeking to be loyal to the truth or to the good, he contends that we are not making use of the "cash-payment" view of experience. "Loyalty does not live by selling its goods for present cash in the temple of its cause." The pragmatist will rightly object to the gratuitous introduction of the word, "present," into the above criticism; and will inquire in turn whether a system which provides no empirical cash-redemption of pledges at all is not a form of the "fiat-money" system by which Professor Royce characterizes one aspect of pragmatism. However, the criticism is all too brief to constitute any contribution to the situation.

The total effect of the book on the reader is that of a stimulating philo-

sophical and ethical homily; while Professor James's book gave an almost journalistic type of entertaining description. It must be admitted that an age which is wont to be satisfied with an exact examination of facts needs such a summons to turn attention to the realm of ideals. But in spite of the logical completeness of the principle of "loyalty to loyalty," the reader is left just where he was before whenever concrete moral problems arise. Like Kant's formally universal principle of legislation for morality, it serves to give a sense of satisfaction to the philosopher in the analysis of his problem, rather than to furnish guidance for practical life.

These two differing methods of dealing with the problem of human life suggest that possibly neither one is adequate to deal with the total field. Are there not two somewhat distinct tasks to be undertaken by the teacher of ethics? Is there not the specific task of arousing and developing the moral personality? And is there not the quite different task of analyzing social problems in the light of the history of morality? To take an analogy from another realm; it is one thing to cultivate the aesthetic sensitiveness of the artist, and another thing to understand the history and purpose of art. To exalt the former alone means unbalanced ebullitions of genius and impulse in art or in ethics. To devote sole attention to the latter means the production of an academic body of learning. Do we not need the points of view of both the absolutist and the pragmatist if we are to do justice both to personality and to social welfare? And since Professor James is quite willing to welcome the conception of the absolute in so far as it has an actual place in interpreting experience while Professor Royce is in the end compelled to affirm his absolute for the very pragmatic reason that he needs to feel that loyalty is not in vain, may we not hope that eventually we shall find for solving moral problems a method superior to either in its polemic aspect?

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What gives the *Ethics*² of Professor Dewey and Professor Tufts a real distinction amid the multitude of ethical textbooks is the fact that it makes the study of ethics appear practical, vital, pertinent to affairs, capable of contributing to the settlement of problems that contemporary mankind is really in doubt about. This is not only a great virtue but also a curiously rare one, in this class of books. "Moral philosophy" is frequently almost the least pragmatic of academic disciplines; it often seems to consist chiefly in

² *Ethics*. By John Dewey and James H. Tufts. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1908. xiii + 618 pages.

disputation about the reasons for accepting certain practical conclusions which nearly all the disputants do in fact accept, conclusions which the majority of civilized society is quite ready to take for granted. This discussion as to the best logical way of deducing the Golden Rule and the Ten Commandments is doubtless a necessary branch of systematic philosophy, and it sometimes leads to fresh and edifying modes of moral appeal; but it does not ordinarily impress the college student or the general reader as a thing of palpitating human interest. Unless ethics can connect directly with the concrete social problems that our generation is seriously exercised about, unless, indeed, its main *raison d'être* be conceived to be that it provides a method for dealing with those problems, the study is likely to remain academic in the worst sense, an inquiry in which differences in doctrine do not, to any important degree, 'make a difference.' From such a chaste and dignified sterility this new textbook should do much to rescue ethical science. The part of the book (by Professor Dewey) which deals with the traditional problems of ethical theory is preceded by a section in which Professor Tufts shows how the categories and preconceptions used by current moral thought were gradually evolved in response to both external and internal developmental changes, and how in new social situations, past or present, such working moral conceptions come, of themselves, to exhibit inconsistencies and inadequacies which make deliberate ethical reflection inevitable. And the theoretical section is in turn followed by a discussion of unsettled problems in the adjustment of human relations, the greater part of it dealing, in an unusually full, concrete, and definite manner, with the three phases of social organization that express the relations now most tending to strain and to readjustment—the political state (treated by Professor Tufts), the economic order, and the family (both treated by Professor Dewey). It is in the scope and quality of these opening and closing sections (together constituting about two-thirds of the volume) that the distinctive excellence of the book chiefly consists. There is space only for the briefest comment upon the three parts separately; and after this general recognition of the importance and value of the work as a whole, the space may perhaps be most serviceably devoted to points where criticism seems possible.

1. Readers of this *Journal* will perhaps be most interested in the two chapters in which Professor Tufts attempts to summarize and contrast the moral development of the Hebrews and the Greeks. That on the Hebrews may be considered inadequate in two not unimportant respects. First, the truly distinctive contribution of the Hebrew to mankind's moral ideas was the conception of a sort of ethical philosophy of history, the recognition of a dramatic unity and a beneficent pedagogic import in the sequence of

temporal events, and the consequent placing of the highest values in the future and the maintenance of an attitude of expectancy. This is also, perhaps, the most marked point of contrast between the deeper religious thought of Greece and Israel. Professor Tufts does not wholly ignore this; but he hardly brings it out sharply and illuminatingly enough. Second, there is (except for some references to Job) almost no consideration given to the one body of directly ethical reflection produced by the Hebrew mind—the Wisdom literature—and no recognition of the important place of that school in the development of Jewish moral ideas, especially through the curious dialectic by which it was led to insist upon the “inwardness” of moral qualities. No mention, either, is made of Hebrew skepticism and pessimism, such as that of Ecclesiastes. There is a certain air of chronological confusion about the whole chapter; distinct periods seem bewilderingly telescoped into one another. Thus, the conception of the relation of Yahweh to Israel, as originating in a deliberate choice and covenant, is apparently referred to “the earlier thought”—a view which is certainly highly debatable. At times, in the midst of what should be objective historical exposition, Professor Tufts lapses into a rather didactic and homiletic manner which seems inappropriate and pedagogically ineffective (e. g., pp. 99, 100).

2. A disquisition on ethical theory, such as Professor Dewey gives in the middle section, always demands consideration under two distinct categories—as literature and as logic. Regarded as literature—as the expression of the author’s personal observations on life and his temperamental estimate of the relative values of things—Professor Dewey’s little treatise is uncommonly interesting. It is infused with a steady and intense conviction that the inner good for a man consists wholly in a single-eyed, outward-looking absorption in concrete, objective, and social ends—a conviction that is often expressed with eloquence. “The true happiness of any individual,” says the author, lies “in the peace and joy that accompany the abiding and equable maintenance of socialized interests as central springs of action,” which “constitutes a kind of happiness with which others cannot be compared. It is unique, final, invaluable.” The ideal of the “socializing” of all interests and desires—that is, of their interpenetration by sympathetic feeling and a sense of their relation to a larger social process—is perhaps Professor Dewey’s most characteristic moral conception. With it goes a certain absence of interest in the non-social or supersocial values which have been supposed to inhere in the inner religious experience of the individual—especially of the mystic—and in the aesthetic experience. The democratic spirit is so strong in Professor

Dewey that he is able to recognize as sins against that spirit modes of action or attitudes of thought that are often supposed to be admirable manifestations of it. Thus he points out that "the vice of the social leader, the reformer, the philanthropist, is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and co-operation of others. . . . The inherent tragedy and irony of much that passes for a high kind of socialized activity is that it seeks a common good by methods which forbid its being either common or a good." In its practical teaching, in short, Professor Dewey's section expresses vigorously and impressively a well-defined type of moral feeling and attitude. But considered as logic—as a connected piece of reasoning from verified premises through well-defined steps to a clear-cut conclusion—the section leaves something to be desired. On its critical side, indeed, it is excellent; the arguments against, e. g., the psychology of hedonism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, the Kantian rigorism—arguments not in themselves novel—are expressed with unusual force and clarity. But the constructive argument is less lucid and convincing; and the moral criterion at which the author arrives is not—in itself or in its premises—so thoroughly distinct from the "self-realization" standard of Green and his disciples as it seems meant to be. The crucial transition in the argument seems to depend upon the observation that the individual's real good or happiness demands social well-being because the self is essentially a social self (pp. 296-98)—a characteristically abstract, loose, and shifty piece of neo-Hegelian phraseology that is susceptible of several senses and is, in some of its senses, decidedly open to question. It is impossible here to go adequately into this technical argument; one is, however, tempted to classify some of the reasoning of the section as an example of Professor Dewey's "first manner."

3. The concluding division of the book is too rich in matter to be fitly dealt with at the fag-end of a brief review; but the reviewer ought at least to commend it heartily to the general reading public. Both writers are thoroughly at home in the discussion of the grave practical questions to which the section is devoted, and both are admirably free from the use of crude moral abstractions so common in the discussion of the ethical aspect of social questions; for an example of a judicious and "concrete" treatment of a vexed question, note Professor Dewey's remarks on the "open" and the "closed" shop (pp. 559-61). The extensive use of this part of the book in colleges should go far toward making the rising generation capable of a much more sane, more open-eyed, more methodical, and less superficial way of thinking about the problems of modern society than has hitherto been common among our educated class.

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